Survey on Prominent RFID Authentication Protocols for Passive Tags by Baashirah, Rania & Abuzneid, Abdelshakour A.
sensors
Review
Survey on Prominent RFID Authentication Protocols
for Passive Tags
Rania Baashirah * and Abdelshakour Abuzneid *
Department of Computer Science and Engineering, University of Bridgeport, Bridgeport, CT 06604, USA
* Correspondence: rbaashir@my.bridgeport.edu (R.B.); abuzneid@bridgeport.edu (A.A.);
Tel.: +1-(203)-576-4113 (A.A.)
Received: 1 September 2018; Accepted: 19 October 2018; Published: 22 October 2018


Abstract: Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) is one of the leading technologies in the Internet
of Things (IoT) to create an efficient and reliable system to securely identify objects in many
environments such as business, health, and manufacturing areas. Recent RFID authentication
protocols have been proposed to satisfy the security features of RFID communication. In this article,
we identify and review some of the most recent and enhanced authentication protocols that mainly
focus on the authentication between a reader and a tag. However, the scope of this survey includes
only passive tags protocols, due to the large scale of the RFID framework. We examined some
of the recent RFID protocols in term of security requirements, computation, and attack resistance.
We conclude that only five protocols resist all of the major attacks, while only one protocol satisfies
all of the security requirements of the RFID system.
Keywords: RFID; security; privacy; authentication; passive tag; security threats; security attacks; IoT;
lightweight protocol
1. Introduction
The wireless sensor network has expanded recently to employ new technologies in the Internet of
Things (IoT). The purpose of this evolution is to create a low-cost, reliable, and secure communication
network for current and future applications using radio waves in the most convenient way.
Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) is a technology where the detection of the electromagnetic
signals in the wireless sensor network identifies objects or people. Hundreds and thousands of
RFID applications have been used to improve business efficiency and productivity in a variety of
business operations, including supply chain management, access control limitation, product tracking,
merchandise allocation, toll collection, and so on. It is also considered an integral part of daily life
where its applications not only are limited to business activities, but also daily life activities that are
integrated into cell phones, household, automobile, etc.
Although the basic concept of RFID is similar to barcodes in identifying the items using the data
stored in barcodes, RFID technology has vital benefits over barcodes. It does not require physical
contact with the objects, allows scanning multiple and different types of barcodes using one signal,
has the ability to read and write on the tag multiple times [1], and enables identifying objects in different
climates such as fog and snow, and packaging conditions such as ice, perishable food, and liquids [2].
RFID is considered a significant structure for future market development. Many business
enterprises and manufactures nowadays in the supply chain, including banks, transportation,
government, agriculture, food safety, health care, and mass production, are using RFID to automate
their product identification faster in different conditions to improve their business efficiency and
customer service experience.
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2. System Architecture and Communication Model
The basic system of RFID includes a receiver (reader), transponder (tag), and back-end database
(server) to store and manage data. The RFID tag is a label that is placed into the object to be identified
and located among hundreds and thousands of objects. It consists of a small antenna attached to a
microchip with a small memory to store the object’s identity and data [3]. The RFID reader is a scanner
placed in a fixed location to interrogate the tag whenever the tag exists in the scanning environment.
The back-end database server operates as a data processor that manages, controls, and stores the data
from the tag and reader. An RFID system is depicted in Figure 1 [4].
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RFID tags can be classified into three categories based on the storage memory, cost, and battery
requirements: passive tags, semi-passive tags, and active tags [5,6].
• A passive tag operates without battery, as the tag is energized when the reader interrogates it by
sending a signal to request tag information. It has a short transmission range in communication,
and has limited resources in term of storage. It is considered the lowest in cost and has a
higher lifespan.
• A semi-passive tag has a battery for its internal chip circuit; however, it is also energized by the
reader interrogation, as in the passive tag.
• An active tag runs with battery and can have two-way communication between tag and reader.
It is larger due to the larger storage capacity and battery. The transmission range is also larger
compare to passive tags. It is more expensive and has a limited life depending on the battery
lifespan [2].
Table 1 provides some comparison of the three types of RFID tags.
Table 1. Classification of RFID Tags [7,8].
Passive Tags Semi-Passive Tags Active Tags
Power Surrounding signal Internal chip battery Integrated battery
Storage Read memory Reade/write memory Reade/write memory
Distance 5 100 m 1000 m
Application Identification Real-time tracking Environmental and logistic
Cost Low High High
Size Small Large Large
Lifespan Unlimited 10 years 10 years
Tag Signal Low High High
Required Signal High Low Low
The basic communication session between an RFID reader and a tag starts when the reader
broadcasts radio waves to interrogate the tag. The tag receives the signal and responds corresponding
to the re der’s request. Since the c mmunicatio channel between the reader and tag is assumed to
be insecure, it is important to maintain a secure system during ommunication to avoid information
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leakage or forgery by unauthorized users. Efficient RFID concerns about system security, cost,
and liability are essential factors for future adoption in the IoT.
3. Security Requirements and Threats
3.1. Security Requirements
The basic entities in the RFID system are the tag, reader, and database server. The communication
channel between a tag and a reader is insecure and vulnerable to different security threats.
Security requirements are the ability features that enable the system to avoid security threats. There are
several security requirements to evaluate the security level of an RFID system:
• Mutual Authentication: the main requirement in a simple scenario of RFID communication session
is the authentication between the reader and tag before exchanging or transmitting any secret or
valuable information. Both tag and reader have to prove their legitimacy to each other to start a
secure communication.
• Confidentiality: all of the transmitted messages have to be secure in which secret information and
values that are used to execute communication cannot be obtained by an unauthorized user.
• Integrity: the transmitted data has to maintain its accuracy and not to be altered or changed
during communication.
• Availability: the communication should be successfully executed by maintaining a synchronous
state between the RFID entities. Communication values have to be updated after every successful
session to provide system availability.
• Privacy: all of the secret information such as tag identity has to be secured in order to provide
anonymity and avoid tracing the tag or its location.
• Forward Security: the transmitted data during communication have to be independent and updated
for every session, and cannot be used or related to another authentication session. If a tag or any
information is compromised, it is impossible for an adversary to pass the authentication on or
violate the system.
3.2. Security Threats
A secure RFID system must be able to resist different types of attacks. Messages in RFID
communication are transmitted in clear, and thus are vulnerable to eavesdrop; hence, secret information
is disclosed. Many RFID protocols are proposed to defend against different attacks such as:
• Replay Attack: an adversary tries to capture the tag response and resend it to the reader to start a
successful communication with the reader or obtain any secret information.
• Man-In-The-Middle: an adversary intercepts the message between two legitimate entities
tag/reader to modify it and send it back.
• Impersonate Attack: an adversary obtains either the reader or tag identity information to create a
forged entity. As a result, the adversary acts as a legitimate entity to pass the authentication and
proceed with the communication.
• Traceability: an adversary traces the tag to find its location and revoke the tag’s privacy. This attack
violates the private information of RFID users, which is an instance where the privacy is important.
• Desynchronization Attack: communication session between tag and reader starts using
the synchronous values stored in both the tag and reader to authenticate each other.
A desynchronization attack occurs when an adversary breaks the synchronous state between the
tag and server by blocking the update messages, causing the communication values stored in
both server and tag to be different.
• Denial of Service: an adversary sends multiple signals simultaneously to the server as responses
to make the system unavailable for further communication, which could further lead to a
desynchronization attack.
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• Cloning: an adversary uses a malicious device to obtain the reader or tag secret information and
create a fake entity that can be used to perform a successful communication.
• Disclosure: an adversary identifies the secret information of the tag and the secret keys used in the
communication to fully compromise the security of the protocol.
Many other security threats have been identified for RFID systems. A secure RFID system is
created to defend against various threats that are related to the application in use.
4. Review of Recent RFID Authentication Protocols
Several articles are proposed to create a secure RFID protocol that improves the security measures
of RFID systems. The modern advancement in technology helps discover many gaps in the proposed
protocols presented in the literature. The aim of this work is to review some of the recent RFID
authentication protocols that specifically use passive tags. We aim to present an adequate comparison
between the protocols in terms of performance and security.
Since a passive tag is a very small chip with scarce resources, it is able to do only low computations.
Hence, RFID protocols are classified in this paper into four categories based on the complexity of
the algorithm that is used to compute the tag responses: heavyweight, simple weight, lightweight,
and ultra-lightweight [9]. Heavyweight algorithms use symmetric and public key cryptography
that is beyond the scale of the passive tag ability to process. Simple-weight algorithms use hash
functions that are also not feasible for passive tag resources. Lightweight algorithms use simple
one-way hash functions, cyclic redundancy checks, and pseudo-random number generators [10].
Finally, ultra-lightweight algorithms use bitwise operations, which can be performed at low cost.
4.1. Heavyweight Protocols
Wang and Sarma [11] proposed two session-based authentication protocols, SB-A and SB-B,
for reader–tag authentication based on symmetric key encryption to ensure privacy and access
control using two types of passive tags. The protocols are based on a symmetric cryptography
algorithm to provide low-cost authentication such as the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES)
and Data Encryption Standard (DES). Protocol SB-A in Figure 2 includes two processes. The first
phase involves mutual authentication between server and tag according to the three-pass mutual
authentication protocol according to the International Organization of Standardization and the
International Electrotechnical Commission—ISO/IEC 9798-2 [12]. The second phase is for generating
a session key between reader and tag according to the Otway–Rees protocol and updating the pseudo
tag identity (PID). Protocol SB-B in Figure 3 uses tags with no memory or ID so that all of the tag’s
information is stored in the server. A physical tag operation is mapped with the digital virtual tag
in the server that can do all of the tag’s executions. The protocol time to keep synchronization is
controlled by the tag nonce and counter, and not the server, because of the limited power of the tag
to keep synchronization. The protocols proved to be secure against major types of attacks; however,
the protocols are considered to be heavyweight, since DES and AES are expensive operations that
require a lot of computational overhead.
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For traceability is ues in RFI , lli tic curve cryptography-based
untraceable a t protocol (ECU) using the Schnorr signature schem . The elliptic
cu ve cryptography is consider d to be a public key cr ptography for RFID systems with low
constrained tags. It is used to solve the issu s of three recent elliptic curve-based u traceable
RFID authentication protocols: Strong Privacy-preserving Authentication proto ol (SPA) [14],
Efficient Mutual Authentication protocol EMA [15], nd ECC-based authentication protocol PII [16].
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Ryu’s protocol generates a digital signature with an appendix on the binary message of arbitrary length,
and requires a cryptographic hash function, as shown in Figure 4. The sender’s session key is combined
with the receiver’s public key to provide privacy, in which the message can be verified by only the
receiver’s private key. Ryu’s protocol is secure against replay attacks, impersonate attacks, traceability
attacks, and it maintains forward security. It requires two scalar multiplications, two hash functions,
a message total size of 544 bits, and two communications between tag and reader. Even though this
protocol requires complex computations associated with scalar multiplications and a hash function,
it does not authenticate the reader.
Sensors 2018, 18, x FOR PEER REVIEW  6 of 31 
 
requires a cryptographic hash function, as shown in Figure 4. The sender’s session key is combined 
with the receiver’s public key to provide privacy, in which the message can be verified by only the 
receiver’s private key. Ryu’s protocol is secure against replay attacks, impersonate attacks, 
traceability attacks, and it maintains forward security. It requires two scalar multiplications, two 
hash functions, a message total size of 544 bits, and two commu ic tions betwe n tag and reader. 
Even though this protocol requires c mplex computations associated with scalar multiplications and 
a hash func ion, it does not authenticate the reader.  
Server S Reader R Tag T 
Setup Phase: 
- Generate elliptic group G of prime 
order q. 
- Choose generator P of group G. 
- Server private/public keys (y, Y = yP) 
- Store tag verifier X = xP (public key) 
 
Authentication Phase: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Step 1: Send random c to T → 
 
 
 
 
 
Step 3: To authenticate tag 
- Compute R’ = y−1 Z 
- Derive X’ = eid ⊕ H (R’, s) 
- Check X’ = X registered verifier 
- Compute v’ = H (R’, c) 
- Authenticate the tag as H(sP − v’ X, c) = v’ 
Store x, X, Y (server public key) 
 
 
 
 
 
Step 2:  
- Pick r as session secret 
- R = rP 
- v = H (R, c) 
- schnorr sign Z = rY, s = r + x * v 
- Encrypted verifier eid = X ⊕ H 
(R,s) 
- Send (eid, Z, s) to R ← 
 
 
 
 
G: Cyclic additive group; P: Generator of group G; q: Order of group G; xi: Tag’s private key; ⊕ XOR; Xi: Tag’s public key; y: 
Server’s private; Y: Server’s public; H: Hash function. 
Figure 4. Elliptic Curve Cryptography-Based Untraceable Authentication Protocol (ECU) by Ryu. 
To reduce the tag’s overhead in heavyweight protocols, Yao et al. [17] introduced The 
Reviving-UNder-DoS (RUND) authentication protocol to defend against denial of service (DoS) and 
preserve user privacy by powering up the tag to do complex computing for symmetric and public 
key cryptography. It leverages the power in DoS scans to enable the tag to respond in two ways: 
either using simple encryption when the tag is activated by low signals from a reader, or using 
public encryption (higher security) when the backscattered signals are high in an insecure 
environment. The more signals there are in communication, the more power charges the tag. The 
option of using public key encryption in RUND protocol is to overcome the problem of breaking up 
the synchronization state between the reader and tag in symmetric key encryption. The protocol is 
secure because secret information is not sent in clear, so no useful information can be gained if any 
message is compromised. Moreover, the parameters used in communication are changed and 
updated in every session, as shown in Figure 5, to prevent replay attack, maintain forward security, 
and resist tracking. Even though the overall efficiency of RUND is O(1), it is still not compliant with 
the Electronic Product Code Class1 Generation2 (EPC C1 G2) standard [18], which is defined by 
EPCGlobal Inc. for RFID data communication.  
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To reduce the tag’s overhead in heav tocols, Yao et al. [17] introduced The
Revi ing-UNder-DoS (RU ) t entication pr tocol to defend against denial of service (DoS)
and preserve user privacy by powering up the tag t do complex computing for symmetric and
public key cryptography. It leverages the power in DoS scans to enable the tag to respond in two
ways: either using simple encryption when the tag is activated by low signals from a reader, or
using public encryption (higher security) when the backscattered signals are high in an insecure
environment. The more signals there are in communication, the more power charges the tag. The option
of using public key encryption in RUND protocol is to overcome the problem of breaking up the
synchronization state between the reader and tag in symmetric key encryption. The protocol is secure
because secret information is not sent in clear, so no useful information can be gained if any message is
compromised. Moreover, the parameters used in communication are changed and updated in every
session, as shown in Figure 5, to prevent replay attack, maintain forward security, and resist tracking.
Even though the overall efficiency of RUND is O(1), it is still not compliant with the Electronic Product
Code Class1 Generation2 (EPC C1 G2) standard [18], which is defined by EPCGlobal Inc. for RFID
data communication.
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privacy, and security against location tracking, impersonating attacks, and tag cloning attack for an 
RFID system. The main idea behind the protocol is to use the server’s public key to create the 
authentication message to avoid breaking the system privacy, as depicted in Figure 6. The IECC 
protocol is secure against major attacks, even though the computation cost is the same as in Chou’s 
protocol that needs to be reduced for practical implementation. 
  
Figure 5. The Reviving-UNder- e i l f i thentication Protocol (RUND) by Yao.
4.2. Simple-Weight Protocols
To bett r improve the performance of ls and reduce the power that is ne ed for
complex operations in EC -based protoc l ] osed a utual authentication pr t col
(IECC) based on the lliptic urve. The prot s hou’s authentication pr t col (EMA) [15],
whic does not fulfill the security requirement of forward security, mutual authentication, tag privacy,
and security against location tracking, impersonating attacks, and tag cloning attack for an RFID
system. The main idea behind the protocol is to use the server’s public key to create the authentication
message to avoid breaking the system privacy, as depicted in Figure 6. The IECC protocol is secure
against major attacks, even though the computation cost is the same as in Chou’s protocol that needs
to be reduced for practical implementation.
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public; Xi: Identifier of ith tag which is a random point in G. 
Figure 6. Mutual Authentication Protocol Based on Elliptic Curve Cryptography (IECC) by Farash. 
Zhang and Qi [20] also proposed another protocol (EECC) to withstand the security weaknesses 
of Chou’s protocol, EMA [15]. EECC protocol enhances patient medication safety by also using 
elliptic curve cryptography. In comparison to EMA protocol, EECC protocol resulted in better 
performance and security resistance to impersonate and forward security attacks. 
B.Chen [21] proposed a role-based access control (RBAC) protocol for mobile RFID to enable 
user privacy, role, and access control through the back-end server based on a certification 
mechanism. RBAC assigns role classes as keys to control the information and the number of times 
each reader can read a tag. RBAC authorizes readers, assigns role classes to control the reader’s 
authority to request tag information, and updates time stamps using random numbers and different 
shared keys between the database server and reader and tag ad, as depicted in Figure 7. Traceability 
and replay attacks are prevented using updated random numbers in every session; access control is 
provided using shared keys to prevent unauthorized readers to request or read any tag’s 
information, and integrity is ensured using timestamps. However, RBAC uses one encryption 
mechanism that is excessive for low-cost passive tags. 
  
Figure 6. Mutual Authentication Prot c l lli tic urve Cryptography (IE C) by F rash.
Zhang and Qi [20] also proposed a t ) to withstand the security weaknes es
of Chou’s protoc l, EMA [15]. EECC protocol enha ces patien medication safety by also using elliptic
curve cryptography. In comparison to EMA pr tocol, EECC protocol resulted in better performance
and security resistance to impersonate and forward security attacks.
B.Chen [21] proposed a role-based access control (RB C) protocol for mobile RFID to enable
user privacy, role, and access control through the back-end server based on a certification mechanism.
RBAC assigns role classes as keys to control the information and the number of times each reader can
read a tag. RBAC authorizes readers, assigns role classes to control the reader’s authority to request
tag information, and updates time stamps using random numbers and different shared keys between
the database server and reader and tag ad, as depicted in Figure 7. Traceability and replay attacks are
prevented using updated random numbers in every session; access control is provided using shared
keys to prevent unauthorized readers to request or read any tag’s information, and integrity is ensured
using timestamps. However, RBAC uses one encryption mechanism that is excessive for low-cost
passive tags.
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Figure 7. Role-Based Access Control Protocol (RBAC) by B. Chen. 
4.3. Lightweight Protocols 
Successful businesses demand an efficient RFID system that is mainly based on low 
computation for a low cost. Many recent RFID protocols use low-cost operations that are handled by 
low-cost passive tags for practical implementations. 
Fernando and Abawajy [22] proposed a mutual authentication protocol for Networked RFID 
Systems NRS, which is a lightweight mutual authentication scheme for an RFID system using low 
operations such as excusive or operation (XOR) and one-way hash functions. However, Alagheband 
and Aref [10] reported NRS to be vulnerable to major attacks and specifically a full disclosure attack 
that compromises the whole RFID system. Alagheband and Aref improved NRS protocol and 
proposed NRS+ by adding three more hash functions to the authentication message to increase the 
system security. X. Chen et al. [23] noted that the NRS+ protocol is exposed to desynchronization 
and traceability attacks by using one random number for the tag and reader. Thus, X. Chen 
proposed NRS++ to improve the security flaws in the previous versions of NRS by generating two 
different random numbers, r1 and r2, for the tag and reader using a pseudo-random number 
generator (PRNG) to defend against replay attack. In Figure 8, the authentication message M3 is 
encrypted using the tag’s random number r1 and reader’s random number r2 to provide message 
integrity, so any modified message cannot be verified by the tag. NRS++ uses fewer hash functions, 
which resulted in less computation overhead and storage space than the other versions, with more 
security power.  
Figure 7. Role-Based Access tr l rotocol (RBAC) by B. Chen.
4.3. Lightweight Protocols
Successful busine ses demand an effici nt RFID system that is m inly based on low c mputation
for a low cost. Many recent RFID protocols use low-cost operations that are andled by low-cost
passive tags for practical implementations.
Fernando and Abawajy [22] proposed a mutual authentication protocol for Networked RFID
Systems NRS, which is a lightweight mutual authentication scheme for an RFID system using low
operations such as excusive or operation (XOR) and one-way hash functions. However, Alagheband
and Aref [10] reported NRS to be vulnerable to major attacks and specifically a full disclosure attack that
compromises the whole RFID system. Alagheband and Aref improved NRS protocol and proposed
NRS+ by adding three more hash functions to the authentication message to increase the system
security. X. Chen et al. [23] noted that the NRS+ protoc l is exposed to desync ronization and
traceability attacks by using one random number for the tag and reader. Thus, X. Chen proposed
NRS++ to improve the security fl ws in the pr vious versions of NRS by gener ting two different
random numbers, r1 and r2, for the tag and reader usi g a ps udo-random number g nerator (PRNG)
to defend against replay attack. In Figure 8, the authentication message M3 is encrypted using the tag’s
random number r1 and reader’s random number r2 to provide message integrity, so any modified
message cannot be verified by the tag. NRS++ uses fewer hash functions, which resulted in less
computation overhead and storage space than the other versions, with more security power.
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Step 4: 
- Extract r2 as r2 = M4 ⊕ K1 
- Compute C3 = H(EPC ⊕ K1||r1||r2) 
- Verify C3 = M5 
If equal: Update the secrets.  
If not equal: terminate  
ID, EPC: Tag identifier; H(): one-way hash function; K1: Server/Tag shared key; r, r1, r2: random No; ⊕/||: XOR and 
concatenation operation. 
Figure 8. Mutual Authentication Protocol for Networked RFID Systems (NRS++) by X. Chen. 
C. Chen [24] proposed Anti-Counting Security Protocol (ACSP) as another lightweight protocol 
for RFID systems to defend from a counter attack, which is defined as the attacker’s ability to count 
the number of objects in a system. Safkhani et al. [25] reported ACSP to be vulnerable to major 
attacks, including the forward/backward traceability attack. Safkhani further proposed ACSP+ to 
improve Chen’s protocol. Later, X. Chen [23] pointed out that ACSP protocol is not secure, and 
proposed ACSP++ to withstand DoS and forward/backward traceability attacks. ACSP++ enhances 
the session identifier (SID) update, which is used to verify the current session, and tag identification 
phases that suffer from different attacks in ACSP and ACSP+ versions. In ACSP++ as depicted in 
Figure 9, a tag identifier (TID) is added to the identification message as (ܫܦܧܰܶതതതതതതതതത, R4, R5, TID) instead 
of (ܫܦܧܰܶതതതതതതതതത, R4, R5), and the authentication message ((ܣܷܶܪܧܰതതതതതതതതതതതത, R4, R5, TID) is replaced with 
(ܣܷܶܪܧܰതതതതതതതതതതതത, R5, TID) to overcome DoS attack and modifying the TID in the identification phase. The 
update phase of every key is associated with two separate nonce values to avoid forward and 
backward traceability. Even though the protocol improved the security weaknesses of all of the 
ACSP versions, it did not lower the computation overhead nor the storage space. 
  
Figure 8. Mutual Authentication Protoc l f r t +) by X. Chen.
C. Chen [24] proposed nti- ti rit r t l ( ) other lightweight protocol
for RFID systems to defend fro a co t r tt , i i fi t tt r’s ability to count
the number of objects in a system. Safkhani et al. [25] repo ted ACSP to be vulnerab e to major att cks,
including the forward/backward traceability attack. S fkhani further proposed ACSP+ to improve
Chen’s protocol. Later, X Chen [23] poi ted out that ACSP protocol is not secure, and p oposed
ACSP++ to withstand DoS and forward/back tr eability attacks. ACSP++ enhances the session
identifier (SID) update, which is used to verify the current session, and tag identific tion phases that
suffer from differ nt attacks in ACSP and ACSP+ versions. In ACSP++ as depicted in Figure 9, a tag
identifier (TID) is add d to the identification m ssage as (IDENT, R4, R5, TID) instead of (IDENT,
R4, R5), and the authentication message (AUTHEN, R4, R5, TID) is replaced with (AUTHEN, R5,
TID) to overcome oS attack and m difying the TID in the identification phase. The update phase of
every key is ass ciated with two separate nonce values to avoid forward and backward traceability.
Even though the protocol improved the security weaknesses of all of the ACSP versions, it did not
lower the computation overhead nor the storage space.
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If not verified: wait until next run. 
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Step 5: 
- Calculate and verify H(ܣܷܶܪܧܰതതതതതതതതതതതത, R5, TID) 
- If not verified: stop the session. 
- If verified: update the tag identifier as TIDnew = 
H(TID||R4||R5) 
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Figure 9. Anti-Counting Security Protocol (ACSP++) by X. Chen. 
Chien and Huang [26] presented LAP, which is a lightweight authentication protocol to solve 
the vulnerabilities in the authentication protocol of Li et al. [27], and enhance the computational cost 
from O(n) to O(1) in identifying tags in RFID systems. The security of LAP protocol is based on a 
synchronized PRNG between reader and tag using a secret key, secret ID, and index pseudonym. In 
Figure 10, LAP protocol uses the rotate operator on the message and left/right operator for the 
divided rotation during the messages that were exchanged to form a secure permutation. Random 
numbers are used to shift the secret values of the tag to be used safely in communication. Then, the 
random number is XORed with the shifted secret value to securely retrieve a tag by the server. The 
server uses the index pseudonym (IDS) to quickly identify the tag in the database instead of 
computing PIDL ⊕ PIDR for every tag to make the computation O(1). LAP protocol is resistant to 
replay attack, DoS, and forward security. It can be employed easily by different standards such as 
EPC Gen2 and ISO 15693 [28] for practical implementation. However, the protocol was noted as 
being partially secure against traceability and synchronization attacks, since a tag can be traced 
between two successful sessions if the tag could not update its IDS.  
  
Figure 9. nti- ti ) by X. Chen.
Chien and Huang [26] res , tication protocol to solve
the vulnerabilities in the a t e ti ti ], e ance the computational cost
from O(n) to O(1) in identifyin ta s i I e security of LAP protocol is based on a
synchronized reader and tag using a secret key, secret ID, and index pseudonym.
In Figure 10, LAP protocol uses the rotate operator on the e sage and left/right operator for the
divided rotation during the ess t tation. Random
numbers are ift the secret values of the tag to be used safely in communication. Then,
the random number is XORed with t e shift d secret value to securely retrieve a tag by th serv r.
The server uses the index pseudonym (IDS) to quickly identify the tag in the database instead of
computing PI L PIDR for every tag to a e t e c tati (1). P protocol is resistant to
replay attack, DoS, and for ar sec rity. It can be e loye easily by ifferent standards such as
EPC Gen2 and ISO 15693 [28] for practical implementation. However, the protocol was noted as being
partially secure against traceability and synchronization attacks, since a tag can be traced between two
successful sessions if the tag could not update its IDS.
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Step 2: 
- Search IDSi 
- If IDS == IDSold: flag = 0, X = Xold 
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• Xnew = g(X||g’) 
- Send R’’ to reader → 
 
 
 
 
 
Step 4: 
- When OK is received, send SID to R → 
Step 1: 
- Generate R1. 
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- Forward R1||R2||R’||IDS to S ← 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
- Forward R’’ to T → 
 
 
 
 
- Forward ACK to S ← 
 
 
- Generate R2 
- Compute g’ = g(R1||R2||X) 
- SID’ = rotate(SID, g’) 
- R’ = left(SID’ ⊕ g’) 
- Send R2||R’||IDS to R ← 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Step 3: 
- Verify R’’ right(SID’ ⊕ g’) 
- Update: 
• IDS = g(IDS||SID’) 
• X = Xnew = g(X||g’) 
- Send ACK to R ← 
SID: Secure ID; PID: Partial ID; IDS: Index pseudonym; g(): Random No. generator; X: l-bit secret key; R1, R2: Random numbers; 
Rotate(): Rotation function; Left(s): Left half of s; Right(s): Right half of s; ACK: Acknowledgement.   
Figure 10. Lightweight Authentication Protocol (LAP) by Chien. 
Burmester and Munilla [29] proposed a lightweight mutual authentication protocol called 
Flyweight that is based on exchanging messages using only PRNG. Their protocol is based on a 
shared PRNG algorithm between the tags and back-end server that takes the same seed to produce 
the same output. The concept of the protocol is to use three consecutive numbers—RN1, RN2, and 
RN3—generated by the same PRNG in the server, and the tags of five numbers if an active adversary 
is presented, such as in Figure 11. Furthermore, RFID tags precompute the values to the server 
challenging the response, so an adversary can be detected based on the response time from the tag. 
The protocol is able to provide mutual authentication, integrity, confidentiality, and forward and 
backward security. In addition, it provides strong synchronization, since the server keeps a record 
for the current and next response value of the tag. 
S. Lee et al. [30] proposed a lightweight protocol (MASS) for RFID systems using XOR and a 
one-way hash function to conform to the scarce resources of RFID tags. The concept of the MASS 
protocol is to challenge the tag with a fresh random string every session, and the tag responds using 
the reader’s value and its own random key to authenticate the reader ad, as depicted in Figure 12. The 
secret key is shared between entities, and all of the messages are encrypted during transmission. 
However, Zuo [31] conducted a survivability experiment on the authentication protocol proposed by 
S. Lee et al. and defined the vulnerability of the protocol to replay, desynchronize, and impersonate 
attacks. Zuo concluded from his experiment that the system could employ two different values for the 
keys (old, new) to recognize the tag and overcome the desynchronization problem.  
  
Figure 10. Lightweig t t e ticati rotocol (LAP) by Chien.
Burmester and Munilla [29] propose li t utual authentication pr t col called
Flyweight that is based on exchanging ss s si only PRNG. Their pr tocol is based on a
shared PRNG algorithm between the tags and back-end server that takes the same seed to produce
the same output. The concept of the protocol is to use three consecutive numbers—RN1, RN2,
and RN3—generated by the same PRNG in the server, and the tags of five numbers if an active
adversary is presented, such as in Figure 11. Furthermore, RFID tags precompute the values to the
server challenging the response, so an adversary can be detected based on the response time from the
tag. The protocol is able to provide mutual authentication, integrity, confidentiality, and forward and
backward security. In addition, it provides strong synchronization, since the server keeps a record for
the current and next response value of the tag.
S. Lee et al. [30] proposed a lightweight protocol (MASS) for RFID systems using XOR and a
one-way hash function to conform to the scarce resources of RFID tags. The concept of the MASS
protocol is to challenge the tag with a fresh random string every session, and the tag responds using
the reader’s value and its own random key to authenticate the reader ad, as depicted in Figure 12.
The secret key is shared between entities, and all of the messages are encrypted during transmission.
Howev r, Zuo [31] conducted a survivability experiment on the auth nticati protocol prop sed by
S. Lee et al. and defin the vuln rability of the protocol to replay, des nchronize, and impersonate
attack . Zuo conclud d from his experiment that the system could employ two different values for the
keys (old, new) to recognize the tag and overcome the desynchronization problem.
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Figure 12. Lightweight Protocol based on Synchronized Secret (MASS) by S. Lee. 
To reduce the communication time during the authentication session, K. Lee et al. [32] proposed 
Efficient Passively-Untraceable Authentication Protocol (EP-UAP). The concept of EP-UAP is that 
the system precomputes all of the necessary computations before the system initialization, so only 
low computation overhead is required on the tag side during the process phase. The protocol is 
based on Randomized Hash-Lock protocol, which uses a static identifier, and its strong security 
against traceability depends mainly on PRNG to randomize the responses, as explained in Figure 13. 
Since precomputing all of the possible random numbers and responses requires a storage memory 
for all of the precomputed data in the database, EP-UAP is preferred for small to medium networks, 
as the storage memory increases when the number of tags increases. The protocol shows a huge 
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To reduce the communication ti e during the au hen ca on sess on, . Lee et al. [32] proposed
Efficient Passively- ntraceable hen ca on o ocol ( - P). The concept of EP-UAP is that
the system preco putes al of t e ecess c s e e e s ste initialization, so only
low computation overhea is re ir t t i . The protocol is
based on Rando ize as - ses a static identifier, and its strong security
against traceability depe s i ize the responses, as explained in Figure 13.
Since precomputing al of the s i l ses requires a storage memory
for al of the preco pute t i is referred for s a l to medium networks,
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as the storage memory increases when the number of tags increases. The protocol shows a huge
improvement over the randomized hash lock protocol in terms of computation time, in that only
requires 40 ms for authentication; this is similar to LRMAP, which is the most efficient one in stateful
protocols. However, it requires 100 MB of database storage memory. The protocol provides integrity
due to the two randomly generated nonce values that are used from both tag and reader, and is secure
against passive attacks and traceability due to the random responses. However, the EP-UAP protocol
seems to be vulnerable to active attacks such as impersonate and replay attacks, since the random
responses depend on the database/reader. It also requires high storage capacity in the database side.
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To defend against a desynchronization attack, Rahman and Ahamad [33] proposed a 
Desynchronization attack-resistant Robust Authentication Protocol (DRAP) in the wireless 
identification and sensing platforms (WISP), where RFID technology is combined with sensor nodes. 
Their protocol mechanism is to decrease the tag collision that leads to DoS attack, as shown in Figure 
14. The technique is to decrease the collision rate at the link layer and maintain the system’s 
efficiency. The protocol also detects the DoS attack and recovers the synchronization state of the 
system. It has higher resources than passive tags, which allow higher security implementation. Yet, 
it has a short distance limitation, where tags can only function less than 1–2 m away from readers.  
Authentication in most RFID protocols is executed between one reader and one tag at a time. 
Liu et al. [34] proposed a grouping proofs-based authentication protocol (GUPA) to enable 
authenticating multiple tags and multiple readers simultaneously, such that multiple readers can 
authenticate a single tag, and multiple tags can be authenticated by a single reader in large-scale 
RFID. GUPA protocol is based on hierarchical identification between independent subgroups in a 
distributed RFID system, and the use of an asymmetric denial mechanism to resist denial-of-proof 
attack (DoP). For the anonymous authentication of a new entity, GUPA deploys a ring signature 
using a lightweight cryptography (elliptic curve). It also uses lightweight bitwise operations for 
readers and tags secret information updates, PRNGs, one-way hash functions, timestamps for 
session freshness, and access lists for each legal reader/tag during system initialization as identity 
flags to prevent forgery and tracking attack, as fully explained in Figure 15. Since the flags are 
chosen randomly from the pseudonym index, queries and responses are independent for each 
session to resist DoP attack; hence, illegal proofs are eliminated during authentication.  
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and access lists for each l gal reade /t g during system initialization as identity flags to pr vent
for ery and tracking attack, as fully explained in Figure 15. Sinc the flags are chose randomly from
t e pseudony index, queries an responses are independent for each sessio to r sist DoP att k;
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Sensors 2018, 18, 3584 15 of 31
Sensors 2018, 18, x FOR PEER REVIEW  15 of 31 
 
Server S Reader R: IDi: Kiprev, Ki, Diprev Tag T: Ki, IDi, Δ 
 
 
 
Step 1: 
- Generate random nr. 
- Send nr to tag → 
 
 
 
 
 
Step 3: 
- Generate P(Ki ⊕ nr||ni) for all tags to verify αi. 
If there is a match: 
- Decrypt αi and βi  
- Retrieve D 
- If Dnewi is not equal to Dnew then update: 
Kiprev = Ki 
X = h(Ki) 
αj = P(X ⊕ nr||ni) 
Ki = h(x) 
Dipev = Dinew 
- Else ignore the message and αj = rand 
If there is no match: 
- Generate P(Kiprev ⊕ nr||ni) for all tags to verify 
αi 
- If correct: 
- Decrypt αi and βi  
- If Dnewi is not equal to Doldi then update: 
αj = P(h(Kiprev) ⊕ nr||ni) 
Diprev = Dinew 
- Else ignore the message and αj = rand 
Else ignore the message and αj = rand  
- Send αj to tag → 
 
 
 
 
 
Step 2: 
If (Δ ≤ Dnew – Dold) 
- Generate random ni 
- αi = P(Ki ⊕ nr||ni) 
- βi = EKwti(h(IDi) ⊕ Dnew) 
- Send αi, βi, ni to reader ← 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Step 4: 
- Y = h(Ki) 
- Generate P(Y ⊕ nr||ni) to verify 
αj 
- if correct: Ki = h(Y) 
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Figure 14. Desynchronization Attack-Resistant Robust Authentication Protocol (DRAP) by Rahman 
and Ahamad. 
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Initialization Phase: 
1- Generate PRN rDB 
2- Send rDB to tag → 
 
 
6- Verify H1 in database for match 
7- H1 = (ΔRj||LR||rTy) 
8- PRNG (ΔRj) 
9- Send H1||PRNG (ΔRj) to tag → 
 
Authentication Phase: 
 
  
 
3- Generate rTy 
4- H1(LR||rDB) 
5- Send rTy||H1(LR||rDB) to DB ← 
 
 
 
 
 
10- PRNG−1(ΔRj) to obtain ΔRj 
11- H1 = (ΔRj||LR||rTy) to authenticate 
DB 
12- Add ΔRj to LR 
LR: Local access list; ΔRj: Reader’s information; H(): One-way hash function. 
Figure 15. Grouping Proofs-Based Authentication Protocol (GUPA) by Liu for a 
Single-Reader—Single-Tag Case. 
Since tag collision is a major problem in the large-scale networks, Rahman and Ahamad [35] 
proposed two probabilistic batch authentication protocols to determine the valid tags efficiently and 
accurately in large-scale systems. FTest is a protocol based on Frame Slotted Aloha algorithm that is 
used to reduce the probability of collision slots. The other protocol is GTest, which is a protocol 
based on group batch authentication that is used to reduce the cost of detecting counterfeit tags. 
Their protocols use simple lightweight operations such as XOR and cyclic redundancy checks (CRC) 
t
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Since tag collision is a ajor proble  in the large-scale net orks, ah an and ha ad [35] 
proposed t o probabilistic batch authentication protocols to deter ine the valid tags efficiently and 
accurately in large-scale syste s. FTest is a protocol based on Fra e Slotted loha algorith  that is 
used to reduce the probability of collision slots. The other protocol is Test, hich is a protocol 
based on group batch authentication that is used to reduce the cost of detecting counterfeit tags. 
Their protocols use si ple light eight operations such as  and cyclic redundancy checks ( ) 
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based on group batch authentication that is used to reduce the cost of detecting counterfeit tags.
Their protocols use simple lightweight operations such as XOR and cyclic redundancy checks (CRC)
with a shared key for each group of tags. The theory in both protocols is not to send the tag ID
when responding, but rather accept or reject a tag by estimating the number of fake tags. In the
FTest protocol that is depicted in Figure 16, a counterfeit threshold parameter is used in the system to
reduce the number of rounds in the detection process and response time of the protocol, so that the
entire tag responses do not need to be checked. Instead, the detection will stop if the percentage of
counterfeit tags exceeds the counterfeit threshold. In GTest, the reader randomly selects a population
of tags to authenticate. If one counterfeit tag is detected, the batch of tags will be considered invalid.
The reader needs to read a large amount of data to identify the validity of a batch in GTest, so the
reader still consumes time through the computation overhead from the tag search. Both FTest and
GTest protocols are proved to be secure against tracking and privacy attacks, since tags responses are
based on dynamic frame size, random numbers, and ID that is not transmitted during communication.
However, the FTest shows less execution time and better performance over GTest.
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tags removed to reduce collision slot. 
Figure 16. Batch Authentication Protocol based on Frame Slotted Aloha (FTest) by Rahman and 
Ahamad. 
Another anti-collision security protocol (ACS) is proposed by Keqiang et al. [36] for a 
high-efficiency RFID system combining the chaotic sequence generator with the dynamic 
frame-slotted ALOHA algorithm for fast tag identification. The protocol scheme is based on a 
logistic mapping structure with XOR operation and spreading operation to generate real-time keys 
in a chaotic sequence that are used in authentication messages. Keys are updated in each response 
from tag to reader and reader to tag during the same session using iteration equations that are 
known only to the server and tag, such as in Figure 17. The protocol is effective against counterfeits 
and impersonates attacks, as the authentication scheme not only depends on the iterated key, but 
also on spreading code and random numbers, so faking at least one of them will result in a wrong 
response. The protocol requires only four message exchanges, low hardware cost, and low 
computation cost on the tag side. It also has lower energy consumption than other heavy and simple 
weight protocols, because XOR uses less energy than symmetric encryption and hash functions.  
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Figure 17. Anti-Collision Security Protocol (ACS) by Keqiang. 
Cho et al. [37] proposed a hash-based mutual authentication protocol (HBA) to defend against 
the brute force attack. This protocol was reported by Chang et al. [6] to be vulnerable to denial of 
service (DoS) and replay attacks. Later, Chang et al. proposed an improved (HBA+) protocol to 
avoid DoS and replay attacks using a shared PRNG algorithm between the server and tag to produce 
the same output that is used in updating the protocol values, as in Figure 18. Also, the confidentiality 
in the protocol is based on protecting the secret value datai using reader ID (Rid), which is only 
known to a legitimate reader and server. The improved protocol of Chang is considered to be 
efficient and secure against DoS attack, traceability, and forward secrecy.   
Figure 17. ti- lli i rit r t l ( ) iang.
Cho et al. [37] proposed a hash-based mut al authentication prot c l (HBA) to defend ag inst the
brute force attack. This protocol was report d by Chang et al. [6] to be vuln rab e to denial of service
(DoS) and replay attacks. Later, Chang et al. proposed an improved (HBA+) protocol to av id D S
and replay ttacks using shared PRNG algorithm between th server and tag to produce the same
output that is sed in updati g the protocol values, as in Figure 18. Also, the confidentiality n the
protocol is based on protecting th secret value datai using reader ID (Ri ), which is only known to a
legitimate read r and s rv r. The improved protocol of Chang is considered to be efficient an secure
against DoS attack, traceability, and forward secrecy.
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Step 4: 
Search the database using I: 
- Found: 
I = Inew {EPCi, Auknew, Acknew, datai} 
I = Iold {EPCi, Aukold, Ackold, datai} 
M1’ = Auknew ⨁ Inew ⨁ PRNG(EPCk ⨁ 
Acknew ⨁ Rt ⨁ Rr) to authenticate T. 
- Not Found: termination. 
- B = datai ⨁ Ridk 
- M2 = PRNG(Auknew ⨁ Rt) ⨁ Acknew 
- C = H(datai ⨁ Rr) 
- Update database values and keys: 
Aukold = Auknew 
Auknew = PRNG(Auknew) 
Ackold = Acknew 
Acknew = PRNG(Acknew) 
Iold = Inew 
Inew = PRNG(Acknew ⨁ Inew) 
- send {B, C, M2} → 
Step 1:  
- Generate random No. Rr → 
 
 
 
Step 3: 
- A = H(Rid ⨁ Rr) 
- ← {M1, Rt, I, A, Rr} 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Step 5: 
- Obtain datai from B 
- C’ = H(datai ⨁ Rr) 
- send M2 → 
 
Step 2: 
- Generate random No. Rt 
- M1 = Auk ⨁ I ⨁ PRNG (EPC ⨁ Ack ⨁ Rr ⨁ 
Rt) 
- ← {M1, Rt, I} 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Step 6: 
- Compute M2’ = PRNG(Auk ⨁ Rt) ⨁ Ack 
- Update tag values and keys 
Rr, Rt: Random No. of reader/tag; Auk: Authentication key of tags shared with server; Rid: Reader ID; EPC: Electronic 
product code of tag; Ack: Access key of tags shared with server; I: Index value of tag; H(): One-way hash function; datai: 
Secret information of the tag’s object. 
Figure 18. Hash-Based Mutual Authentication (HBA+) Protocol by Chang. 
Z.Liu et al. [38] proposed variable linear shift-based authentication protocol (VLP) to support 
the implementation of RFID for the new EPC Gen2v2 standard, satisfy its security features of 
untraceability and access control, and reduce a tag’s read range. In Figure 19, the protocol is based 
on a lightweight encryption function called Variable Linear Feedback Shift Register (VLFSR), which 
is implemented at the application-specific integrated circuit (ASIC) level. In every session, mutual 
authentication involves different random numbers from the tag and reader combined with the new 
secret value SID stored in the database to provide resistance against active attacks. 
Another protocol (OMP) is proposed by Niu et al. [39] mainly for passive tag ownership 
transfer using a lightweight authentication mechanism to support EPC Gen2 standard. Since the 
ownership transfer is based on transferring the keys, the OMP protocol aims to prove the possession 
of the shared secret key to a tag and reader without disclosing it using ultra-lightweight permutation 
operation (Per), as in Figure 20. Yet, the protocol has no mechanism to check the freshness of the 
message that is sent by a legitimate reader.   
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Step 5: Authenticate and Update 
1- Find an SIDj match in database based 
on UID 
2- Extract Rt1, Rt2  
3- (Rt2||Rt1) ⨁ SIDj 
4- Find mj from Mj table based on SIDj 
5- Bb = VLFSR (Rt1||Rr, mj) 
6- If Bb = Bt, proceed to update 
• mj+1 = (Rt2||Rt1) ⨁ mj 
• SIDj+1 = VLFSR (Rt1||Rt2, mj) 
• Store new values in Mj and keep 
the old in Mj−1 tables. 
7- If Bb ≠ Bt, find mj and SIDj from Mj−1 
table and do step3 
8- If no match is found, protocol will 
stop. 
 
Step 6:  
- Send to reader VLFSR (Rt1||Rr, SIDj) → 
 
Step 1:  
- Generate random Rr 
- Send Rr to tag → 
 
 
 
 
 
Step 4: 
- Send to server Rr, Bt, (Rt2||Rt1) ⨁ SIDj 
and UID ← 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Step 7:  
- Send to reader VLFSR (Rt1||Rr, SIDj) 
→ 
 
 
 
Step 2:  
- Generate random Rt1, Rt2 
- Secret value = mj 
- Bt = VLFSR (Rt1||Rr, mj) 
 
Step 3: 
- Send to reader Bt, (Rt2||Rt1) ⨁ 
SIDj ← 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Step 8: Authenticate R and S 
- Authentication via received msg. 
- mj+1 = Rt2||Rt1) ⨁ mj 
- SIDj+1 = VLFSR (Rt1||Rt2, mj) 
SID: Session secure ID of tag; UID: Unique ID of tag; Rr: Reader random No.; Rt1, Rt2: Random No. generated by tag; mj: 
Secret value used in a session; VLFSR(): Variable LFSR function. 
Figure 19. Variable Linear Shift-Based Authentication Protocol (VLP) by Z. Liu et al. 
Server S Reader R: K, KM, EPC, RID1 Tag T: K, KM, EPC, RID, IDS 
Mutual 
Authentication: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1- Generate random rnd1, rnd2 of 96 bits 
2- Ai = rnd1i ⨁ PRNG(Ki ⨁ RID1i) ⨁ PRNG(Ki ⨁ 
RID2i) 
3- Bi = rnd2i ⨁ PRNG(rnd1i ⨁ Ki) 
4- Ci PRNG(rnd1i ⨁ RID1i) ⨁ PRNG(rnd2i ⨁ 
RID2i) 
5- Send Ai, Bi, Ci to tag → 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
9- Verify D: 
- D’i = PRNG(Ki+1 ⨁ IDSi+1), where i = 1 to 6 
- If D is verified, tag is authenticated 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6- Extract rnd1, rnd2 
- rnd1i = Ai ⨁ PRNG(Ki ⨁ RID1i) ⨁ PRNG(Ki ⨁ 
RID2i) 
- rnd2i = Bi ⨁PRNG(rnd1i ⨁ Ki) 
- C’i = PRNG(rnd1i ⨁ RID1i) ⨁ PRNG(rnd2i ⨁ 
RID2i) 
 
7- If C = C’, reader authenticated 
- Ki+1 = Per(rnd1i, Ki) ⨁ K(i+1 mod 6) 
- IDSi+1 = Per(rnd2i, Ki) ⨁ Ki 
- Di = PRNG(Ki+1 ⨁ IDSi+1), where i = 1 to 6 
 
8- Send D to reader←  
K: Secret shared key for owners; KM: Master key to modify K. EPC: Static ID of a tag. RID: ID of reader owning tag. IDS: 
Pointer to tag database. 
Figure 20. Passive Tag Ownership Authentication Protocol (OMP) Protocol by Niu. 
Dass and Om [40] also proposed an efficient authentication protocol (SEAS) that uses 
lightweight operations and a pseudo-random number generator (PRNG) for a low computational 
cost. Their scheme is based on a secure channel between the back-end server and reader, prestored 
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Server S Reader R: K, KM, EPC, RID1 Tag T: K, KM, EPC, RID, I S 
utual 
Authentication: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1- Generate rando  rnd1, rnd2 of 96 bits 
2- Ai = rnd1i  PRNG(Ki  RID1i)  PRNG(Ki  
RID2i) 
3- Bi = rnd2i ⨁ PRNG(rnd1i ⨁ Ki) 
4- Ci PRNG(rnd1i ⨁ RID1i) ⨁ PRNG(rnd2i ⨁ 
RID2i) 
5- Send Ai, Bi, Ci to tag  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
9- Verify D: 
- D’i = PRNG(Ki+1 ⨁ IDSi+1), where i = 1 to 6 
- If D is verified, tag is authenticated 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6- Extract rnd1, rnd2 
- rnd1i = Ai ⨁ PRNG(Ki ⨁ RID1i) ⨁ PRNG(Ki ⨁ 
RID2i) 
- rnd2i = Bi ⨁PRNG(rnd1i ⨁ Ki) 
- C’i = PRNG(rnd1i ⨁ RID1i) ⨁ PRNG(rnd2i ⨁ 
RID2i) 
 
7- If C = C’, reader authenticated 
- Ki+1 = Per(rnd1i, Ki) ⨁ K(i+1 mod 6) 
- IDSi+1 = Per(rnd2i, Ki) ⨁ Ki 
- Di = PRNG(Ki+1 ⨁ IDSi+1), where i = 1 to 6 
 
8- Send D to reader←  
K: Secret shared key for owners; KM: Master key to modify K. EPC: Static ID of a tag. RID: ID of reader owning tag. IDS: 
Pointer to tag database. 
Figure 20. Passive Tag Ownership Authentication Protocol (OMP) Protocol by Niu. 
Dass and Om [40] also proposed an efficient authentication protocol (SEAS) that uses 
lightweight operations and a pseudo-random number generator (PRNG) for a low computational 
cost. Their scheme is based on a secure channel between the back-end server and reader, prestored 
i . l ( ) r t c l by iu.
ass an [ ] ls r s ffici t t tic ti r tocol (SE S) that uses
lightweight operations and a pseudo-random number gen rator (PRNG) for a low computational cost.
Sensors 2018, 18, 3584 20 of 31
Their scheme is based on a secure channel between the back-end server and reader, prestored tags’
secret (SIDs) in the tags side, a one-way hash function of the tag ID in the server side, and rewritable
memory with a flag indicator in the server side to update the secret values. Any change to the messages
transmitted leads to terminate the communication during the verification to resist security attacks,
as shown in Figure 21.
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Server S Reader R Tag T 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Step 4: 
Search the database using h(ID): 
- Not Found: termination 
- Found: verify V 
V’ = PRNG(Snew ⨁ NR ⨁ NT) 
Send Snew to reader → 
Flag = 0 
 
V” = PRNG(Sold ⨁ NR ⨁ NT) 
Send Sold to reader → 
Flag = 1 
 
 
 
Step 6: 
- Flag = 0 → S = Snew 
U = h (Snew||M) 
Sold = Snew 
Snew = Snew ⨁ U 
 
- Flag = 1 → S = Sold 
U = h (Sold||M) 
Sold = Sold 
Snew = Sold ⨁ U 
Step 1:  
- Generate random No. NR → 
 
 
 
Step 3: 
- ← {V,H, NR, NT} 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Step 5: 
- Reader takes Snew or Sold 
- M = PRNG(Snew, old, NR) 
- N = PRNG(M) 
- Send N to tag → 
- ← send M to server 
 
 
Step 2: 
- Generate random No. NT 
- V = PRNG (S ⨁ NR ⨁ NT) 
- H = h (ID) 
- ← {V, H, NT} 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Step 6: 
- To authenticate reader: 
Calculate M’ = PRNG(S, NR) 
Calculate N’ = PRNG(M’) 
Verify N’ = N 
- If equal calculate U = h (S||M’) 
- Update S = S ⨁ U 
h(): One-way hash function; NR, NT: Random No. generated by reader/tag; S: Secret value of tag; ID: ID pseudonym 
of tag; Snew, Sold: Current and old session secrets of tag. 
Figure 21. Efficient Authentication Protocol (SEAS) by Dass and Om. 
An alternative solution to replace the central database in the RFID system is to use a serverless 
model in which the database server does not maintain a connection with the readers and tags during 
the communication. Regarding this challenge, Mtita et al. [41] proposed (SAP), a serverless security 
protocol used for the mass authentication of RFID tags in the presence of untrusted readers. In SAP 
protocol, the reader and tag do not communicate with the back-end server; instead, they 
authenticate each other using only ephemeral of the tag’s secrets that expire within a given time, as 
shown in Figure 22. Verification and authentication between reader and tag are done during the 
authentication phase to exchange the data and generate the session key locally in both tag and reader 
for their next communication. The protocol has also been proved using the CryptoVerif tool [42], which 
was shown to have low computation overhead and resources. 
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r t l, the reader and tag do not communicate with the back-end server; instead, they authenticate
eac other using nly ephemeral of t e tag’s secrets that xpire within a given time, as shown in
Figure 22. Verification and authentication b tween read r and tag r do e during the authentication
phas to exchange the data a d gen rate the session k y locally i both tag and reader for their next
c mmunication. The protocol has also been proved usi g the CryptoVerif tool [42], which was shown
to have low computation overhead and resources.
Sensors 2018, 18, 3584 21 of 31
Sensors 2018, 18, x FOR PEER REVIEW  21 of 31 
 
Server: S Reader: Rj Tag: Ti 
Initialization Phase: 
 
2- Generate Kij, tempij, ARij (access right) 
for each tag derived from time window 
and start date 
Kij = HMACidi(Wsj||ARij) 
3- Build lists of authenticated tags Lj for 
Rj 
Lj − {(temp1j, K1j), (temp2j, K2j),.., (tempij, 
Kij)} 
4- Send Lj, ARij, Wsj to Rj → 
 
Mutual Authentication Phase: 
 
 
1- Request permission from server S. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1- Generate rj 
2- Send to tag A= WSj, ARij, rj → 
 
 
6- Verify H’ij = HMACKij (ri||rj) 
If equal: Ti is authenticated 
If not equal: Kij is not in the list and tag is 
not authorized 
7- Generate timestamp tj and calculate 
Vij = HMACKij (ri||tj) 
9- Send to tag C =  ti, Vij → 
 
 
 
12- Generate session key 
KS = HMACKij (tj||ri WSj) 
- Ti has Timestamp TSYS and idi 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3- Generate ri 
4- Hij = HMACKij (ri||rj) 
5- Send to reader B = Hij, ri ← 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
10- Verify V’ij = HMACKij (ri||tj) 
If equal: Rj is authenticated 
11- Update TSYS = tj 
 
 
13- Generate session key 
KS = HMACK’ij (tj||ri WSj) 
TSYS: Tag static timestamp; tj: Reader timestamp; idi: Tag ID; Kij: Tag’s key; tempij: Temporary tag ID; ARij: Access rights; 
Wsj: Time window; Ks: Session key; Lj: List of authorized tags; ri, rj: Reader/Tag random No.  
Figure 22. Serverless Security Authentication Protocol (SAP) by Mtita. 
4.4. Ultra-Lightweight Protocols 
As mentioned earlier in this paper, passive tags are small chips with scarce resources that can 
only support low-cost operations. The goal of ultra-lightweight protocols is to reduce the cost of 
RFID systems at a minimum and provide strong security for promising future use. In this regard, 
Sundaresan et al. [43] introduced an ultra-lightweight serverless protocol (STS) using only simple 
XOR and 128-bit PRNG operations that require less than 2000 gates, three random number 
generation on the tag, and two message exchanges. In Figure 23, the STS protocol mechanism is to 
use a blind factor to hide the pseudo-random numbers that are used in communication between 
readers and tags to overcome impersonation attacks. RFID tag is also able to preserve its location 
privacy by responding as a noise tag. Moreover, the protocol does not employ a one-way hash 
function nor any encryption conforming to EPC C1 G2 Standards.   
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to hide the pseudo-random numbers that are used in communication between readers and tags to
overcome impersonation attacks. RFID tag is also able to preserve its l cation privacy by responding
as a noise tag. M reover, the pr tocol does not employ a one-way hash function nor any encryption
co formi g to EPC C1 G2 Standards.
Sensors 2018, 18, 3584 22 of 31
Sensors 2018, 18, x FOR PEER REVIEW  22 of 31 
 
Server: ts Reader R Tag T 
Setup Phase: 
- Stores access list (AL) of all n tags: 
h(TID1, ts1) = id1, rts1, ctr1, ctrmax1 
h(TIDn, tsn) = idn, rtsn, ctrn, ctrmaxn 
- Establish shared rts between a reader 
and each tag to be searched. 
 
Search Phase: 
- Server is offline. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
- Precompute and store id = 
h(TID, ts) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Step 1: 
1- Check that ctr <= ctrmax 
2- Generate PRN rr 
3- B = rtsj ⨁ idi 
4- M1 = idi ⨁ PRNG (rtsj ⨁ rr) 
5- M2 = rr ⨁ B 
6- Broadcast M1, M2 to all 
tags → 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Step 3: 
1- Extract tr from M4 
2- Verify rtsj = M3 ⨁ PRNG 
(idj ⨁ tr) 
3- If verified, tag is 
authenticated 
4- Update rtsj = M3 ⨁ PRNG 
(idj ⨁ tr) 
ctr = ctr + 1 
 
- Stores id = h(TID, ts). 
- Stores for each reader: 
rts1, rts1−1, ctr1, ctrmax1, rr1−1 
rtsm, rtsm−1, ctrm, ctrmaxm, rrm−1 
- ctr = 0. 
 
 
Step 2: 
1- B = rts ⨁ id 
2- Extract rr from M2 = B ⨁ rr 
3- Check rr: 
- If rr = rr−1, a replayed msg, exit. 
- If rr ≠ rr−1, proceed 
4- Verify id = M1 ⨁ PRNG (rts ⨁ rr): 
- If equal, reader is authenticated 
- If not equal, repeat using rts−1. 
- If not equal, respond with λ and 
exit. 
5- If id is verified, check if ctr < ctrmax: 
- Generate PRN tr 
- M3 = rts ⨁ PRNG (id ⨁ tr) 
- M4 = tr ⨁ B 
6- Update rr−1 = rr 
7- If id is verified using rts: 
- Update rts−1 = rts 
- rts = PRNG (rts) 
- ctr = ctr + 1 
8- Send M3, M4 to reader ← 
AL: Access list for the reader; ts: Secret key of tag; rts, rts−1: Shared secrets between reader/tag; B: Blind factor to hide PRN;  
ctr: Counter value; ctrmax: Number of times a reader is pre-authorized to search; TID: Tag ID; id: hashed value of TID; rr: 
Random No. of reader in current session. 
Figure 23. Ultra-Lightweight Serverless Authentication Protocol (STS) by Sundaresan. 
Aggarwal and Das [44] proposed the CHW+ protocol, which is based on a previous version 
introduced by Y. Chen, Wang, and Hwang (CWH) [45]. In Figure 24, the protocol CHW+ solves the 
problem of full disclosure attack due to the simple XOR operation that is used in the authentication 
message, which uses the bit rotation and shifting operation on the message before transmission to 
increase the protocol complexity. CWH+ protocol is resistant to replay attack, forge attack, and DoS 
with a very efficient computation.  
Huang and Li [46] proposed and implemented two improved protocols of RFID mutual 
authentication based on generating the PadGen function in the ISO 18000-6C [47] protocol to protect 
the memory with a 32-bit access password. The concept of their protocols is to cover up the tag’s 
access password (Apwd) before transmitting the data using a set of 16-bit random numbers such as 
RTx and RMx. One of the improved schemes, PadGen with XOR (PGX), implements XOR operation 
between the random number sets and the PadGen function; the other protocol, PadGen with Mod 
(PGM), implements a Modulo operation (MOD9) in the eight-bit half of the 16-bit random number 
set (RTx, RMx) to be used in the PadGen function. Both improved schemes conform to the EPC C1 
G2 standard, do not require any hash function or key exchange, do not involve synchronization for 
hash or key values, and also show better efficiency during implementation. The security level of the 
MOD scheme is higher due to the low-cost implementation, but requires a higher computation cost 
in PadGen than XOR.   
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- n = weight(r) 
- r’ = Rot(r,n) 
- r’prev = Rot(rprev, n) 
- Retrieve and verify TID to authenticate 
tag. 
- r’’ = Rot(r’, n) 
- r’’prev = Rot(r’prev, n) 
- t2 = (TID + r’’prev) ⋀ r’’ 
- Update rold = rprev, rprev = r’ 
- Send t2 to tag → 
 
Step 1: 
- Generate random r. 
- s = RID ⨁ r 
- n1 = weight(RID), n1 = no. of bit value 1 of 
RID 
- s’ = Rot(s, n1) 
- Send s’ to tag → 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Step 3: 
- Forward t1, r to server ← 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Step 2: 
- s = Rot’(s’, n1) 
- Retrieve r = RID ⨁ s 
- n1 = weight(r) 
- r’ = Rot(r, n1) 
- r’prev = Rot(rprev, n1) 
- t1 = (TID ⨁ r’prev) + (r’ ⋀ 
r’prev) 
- Send t1 to reader ← 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Step 4: 
- Compute r’’, r’’prev as the 
server 
- t’2 = (TID + r’’prev) ⋀ r’’ 
- Verify t’2 = t2 
- Update rprev = r’ 
RID: Reader ID; Rot(): Rotation function; TID: Tag ID; Weight(r): number of 1’s in the binary string shifts r to the left for n 
bits. 
Figure 24. Improved Authentication Protocol (CWH+) by Aggarwal and Dass. 
Huang and Jiang [48] proposed an ultra-lightweight reader–tag mutual authentication protocol 
(MACC) based on Chien and Chen’s protocol [49] to overcome forge attacks, DoS, and forward 
security attacks. Although the improved scheme uses only lightweight operations such as RNG, 
PRNG, and XOR, it involves an exhaustive search in the database for tag pseudo-IDs in every session 
that leads to computational overhead, as shown in Figure 25. It also fails to resist tracking attacks.  
Server S Reader R Tag T 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Step 4: 
- Verify VR using reader ID and r1 
- Search database for tag PIDi 
- Verify M1 as: r2 = M1 ⨁ Niold OR r2 = M1 ⨁ Ninew 
- Verify M2 as: M2 = P(EPCi||r1||r2||Kiold or 
Kinew) 
- M3 = P(EPCi||r2||Nix||Kix) x = old or new 
- Send M3 to reader → 
 
- If x = new, proceed to update 
Niold = Ninew, Ninew = P(Ninew ⨁ r2) 
Kiold = Kinew, Kinew = P(Kinew ⨁ r2) 
PIDiold = PIDinew, PIDinew = P(PIDinew ⨁ r2) 
Step 1: 
- Generate r1 
- VR = h(RIDj ⨁ r1) 
- Send to tag r1 → 
 
Step 3: 
- Send to server (M1, M2, PIDi, r1, 
VR) 
 
 
 
 
 
Step 5: 
- Forward M3 to tag → 
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Huang and Jiang [48] proposed an ultra-lig t r–tag utual authentication pr t col
(MACC) based on Chien a d Chen’s protoc l [49] to overc me forge attacks, DoS, and forward security
attacks. Although the improved scheme uses only lightweight operations such as RNG, PRNG,
and XOR, it involves an exhaustive search in the database for tag pseudo-IDs in every session that
leads to computational overhead, as shown in Figure 25. It also fails to resist tracking attacks.
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Huang and Jiang [48] proposed another mutual authentication protocol (MACD) based on Chen
and Deng’s scheme [50] to overcome forge attacks, DoS, replay attacks, and mainly the tag identification
time. It is shown in Figure 26 that the MACD protocol uses ultra-lightweight operations and achieves
a lower communication cost between tag and reader than the other improved scheme, MACC.
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Considering the complexity of the authentication protocol, Hopper and Blum proposed the first 
HB protocol to identify unaided humans to computers [51]. Many authors adopted the idea of HB 
protocol to identify tags in RFID networks. As a matter of fact, HB family protocols are based on the 
hard problems of Learning Parity with Noise (LPN), which involves the calculation of inner 
products of binary vectors and Bernoulli noise bit generation [52]. In this regard, Lin and Song [53] 
proposed HBROT, which is one of the latest HB protocols that produces the key in each 
authentication round using the rotation function. The protocol is considered to be secure against 
most of the RFID attacks. 
Another improvement of the HB protocol is proposed by Juels and Weis [54] as (HB+) to 
overcome the weaknesses of the original HB. The HB+ protocol involves two secret keys, x and y, 
which are used with shared blind vectors between the reader and tag. The reader and tag verify the 
values that are computed to perform the mutual authentication. Later, the protocol is reported by 
Gilbert et al. [55] to be vulnerable to the man-in-the-middle attack (MIM). Hence, Ouaskou et al. [56] 
proposed a variant of HB protocol based on Permutation function (HBPER). The protocol performs a 
permutation of the keys x, y during each round of the protocol to update the value of the keys, as 
shown in Figure 27. This method secures the protocol against the MIM attack that is reported in the 
HB+ protocol, although both protocols HB+ and HBPER almost have the same complexity. 
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r problems of Learni g Parity with Noise (LPN), which involves the calculation of inner products
of binary vectors and Bernoulli noise bit generation [52]. In this regard, Lin and Song [53] proposed
HBROT, which is one of t e latest HB protocols that produces the key in each authentication round
using the rotation functio . T protocol is considered to be secure against most f the RFID attack .
Another improvement of the HB protocol is proposed by Juels and Weis [54] as (HB+) to overcome
the weaknesses of the original HB. The HB+ protocol involves two secret keys, x and y, which are used
with shared blind vectors betw en the reader and tag. The reader and tag verify th values that are
computed to perform t e mutual authentication. Later, the protocol is reported by Gilbert et al. [55] to
be vulner ble to the man-in-the-middle attack (MIM). H ce, Ouaskou t al. [56] proposed a va iant of
HB p otocol based on Permutation functio (HBPER). Th protocol performs a permutation of the
keys x, y during each round of the protocol to upd te the value of the keys, as sh wn in Figure 27.
This meth d secur s the protocol against the MIM attack that is reported in the HB+ protocol, although
both protocols HB+ and HBPER almost hav the same complexity.
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5. Analysis and Security Evaluation 
In this section, we compare the different protocols in terms of computation, security 
requirements, and attacks resistance. Since the passive tag used in the RFID system has limited 
computation capabilities and resources, it is important to consider the computation and security 
features for the appropriate application. Table 2 demonstrates the different operations computed by 
the tag in each protocol, and the communication overhead based on the number of transmitted 
messages between tag and reader. 
Table 2. Comparison of the Computation Cost on Tag. 
Protocol Operations Tag Passes Reader Passes Tag Overhead 
SB-A [11] 1 TENC + 2 TDEC + 2 TPRNG 2 3 High 
SB-B [11] 2 TENC + 2 TDEC + 2 TPRNG 2 3 High 
EMA [15] 2 TSMUL + 2 TCH 2 1 High 
ECU [13] 2 TSMUL + 2 TCH 1 1 High 
SPA [14] 4 TSMUL + 1 TCH 1 1 High 
PII [16] 4 TSMUL + 3 TCH 1 1 High 
RUND [17] 2 TH OR 1 TENC + 1 TPRNG 1 2 High 
IECC [19] 2 TSMUL + 2 TH 1 2 High 
EECC [20] 2 TSMUL + 2 TH 1 2 High 
RBAC [21] 2 TENC + 2 TDEC + 1 TPRNG 2 2 High 
DRAP [33] 1 TENC + 3 TXOR + 3 TH + 1 TRNG + 2 TPRNG 1 2 High 
NRS [22] 10 TXOR + 3 TH 4 5 Medium 
NRS+ [10] 10 TXOR + 6 TH 4 5 Medium 
NRS++ [23] 8 TXOR + 4 TH 1 2 Medium 
ACSP [24] 3 TXOR + 7 TH + 4 TCRC 1 4 Medium 
ACSP+ [25] 4 TXOR + 8 TH 2 4 Medium 
ACSP++ [23] 6 TXOR + 8 TH 1 2 Medium 
MASS [31] 4 TXOR + 2 TH + 1 TRNG 1 2 Medium 
EP-UAP [32] 2 TH + 1 TRNG 1 2 Medium 
GUPA [34] 2 TH + 3 TPRNG + 19 TBIT 3 3 Medium 
HBA [37] 6 TXOR + 2 TH + 1 TRNG + 4 TMOD 1 2 Medium 
VLP [38] 2 TXOR + 2 TRNG + 3 TBIT + 2 TVLFSR 1 2 Medium 
SEAS [40] 1 TXOR + 2 TH + 1 TRNG + 3 TPRNG + 1 TBIT 1 2 Medium 
SAP [41] 2 TH + 2 TRNG 1 2 Medium 
LAP [26] 2 TXOR + 1 TRNG + 2 TPRNG + 1 TROT + 1 TSHIFT 2 2 Low 
Flyweight [29] 5 TPRNG 3 3 Low 
FTest [35]  1 TXOR + 3 TCRC 3 2 Low 
i . .
5. Analysis and Security Evaluation
In this section, we compare the different protocols in terms of computation, security requirements,
and attacks resistance. Since the passive tag used in the RFID system has limited computation
capabilities and resources, it is important to consider the computation and security features for the
appropriate application. Table 2 demonstrates the different operations computed by the tag in each
protocol, and the communication overhead based on the number of transmitted messages between tag
and reader.
Table 2. Comparison of the Computation Cost on Tag.
Protocol Operations Tag Passes Reader Passes Tag Overhead
SB-A [11] 1 TENC + 2 TDEC + 2 TPRNG 2 3 High
SB-B [11] 2 TENC + 2 TDEC + 2 TPRNG 2 3 High
EMA [15] 2 TSMUL + 2 TCH 2 1 High
ECU [13] S UL + 2 CH 1 1 i
SPA [14] 4 T + 1 T 1 1 High
PII [16] 4 TSMUL + 3 TCH 1 1 High
RUND [17] 2 TH OR 1 TENC + 1 TPRNG 1 2 High
IECC [19] 2 TSMUL + 2 TH 1 2 High
EECC [20] 2 TSMUL + 2 TH 1 2 i
RBAC [21] 2 TENC + 2 TDEC + 1 TPRNG 2 2 High
DRAP [33] 1 TENC + 3 TXOR + 3 TH + 1 TRNG + 2 TPRNG 1 2 High
NRS [22] 10 TXOR + 3 TH 4 5 Medium
NRS+ [10] 10 TXOR + 6 TH 4 5 Medium
N S++ 2 8 TXOR + 4 TH 1 2 Medium
ACSP [24] 3 TXOR + 7 TH + 4 TCRC 1 4 Medium
ACSP+ [25] 4 TXOR + 8 TH 2 4 Medium
ACSP++ [23] 6 TXOR + 8 TH 1 2 Medium
MASS [31] 4 TXOR + 2 TH + 1 TRNG 1 2 Me i
EP-UAP [32] 2 TH + 1 TRNG 1 2 Me i
GUPA [34] 2 TH + 3 TPRNG + 19 TBIT 3 3 Medium
HBA [37] 6 TXOR + 2 TH + 1 TRNG + 4 TMOD 1 2 Medium
VLP [38] 2 TXOR + 2 TRNG + 3 TBIT + 2 TVLFSR 1 2 Medium
SEAS [40] 1 TXOR + 2 H + 1 TRNG 3 PRNG + 1 TBIT 1 2 Me i
SAP [41] 2 T + 2 T 1 2 Mediu
LAP [26] 2 TXOR + 1 TRNG + 2 TPRNG + 1 TROT + 1 TSHIFT 2 2 Low
Flyweight [29] 5 TPRNG 3 3 Low
FTest [35] 1 TXOR + 3 TCRC 3 2 Low
ACS 6] 3 TXOR + 2 TITER + 1 TSPR 1 2 Low
HBA+ [6] 7 TXOR + 1 TRNG + 5 TPRNG 1 2 Low
OMP [39] 12 TXOR + 6 TPRNG + 2 TPER 1 1 Low
STS [43] 7 TXOR + 3 TPRNG 1 1 Low
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Table 2. Cont.
Protocol Operations Tag Passes Reader Passes Tag Overhead
CWH+ [44] 2 TXOR + 5 TROT + 1 TSHIFT + TBIT 1 1 Low
PGX [46] 8 TXOR + 2 TRNG 2 2 Low
PGM [46] 4 TXOR + 2 TRNG + 32 TMOD 2 2 Low
MACC [48] 6 TXOR + 5 TPRNG 1 2 Low
MACD [48] 5 TXOR + 3 TPRNG + 1 TCRC 1 2 Low
HBROT [53] 1 TRNG + 2 TROT + 1 TXOR + 1 TBIT 1 1 Low
HBPER [56] 1 TRNG + 2 TPER + 1 TXOR + 1 TBIT 1 1 Low
TENC: encryption, TDEC: decryption, TPRNG: pseudo-random number generator, TRNG: random number generator,
TSMUL: scalar multiplication, TXOR: XOR, TCH: cryptographic hash, TH: one-way hash function, TCRC: cyclic
redundancy check, TROT: rotation, TSHIFT: shifting, TITER: iteration, TBIT: bitwise operation, TSPR: spreading, TPER:
permutation, TMOD: modulo, TVLFSR: variable linear shift register function.
5.1. Comparison of Computation Cost
We denote TENC, TDEC, TPRNG, TRNG, TSMUL, TXOR, TCH, TH, TCRC, TROT, TSHIFT, TITER, TBIT,
TSPR, TPER, TMOD, TVLFSR as the computation cost for encryption, decryption, pseudo-random
number generator, random number generator, scalar multiplication, XOR, cryptographic hash,
one-way hash function, cyclic redundancy check, rotation, shifting, iteration, bitwise operation,
spreading, permutation, modulo, variable linear shift register function, respectively. Tag overhead is
classified based on the cryptographic level of operations used in the protocol: high for symmetric key
cryptography and scalar multiplication, medium for one-way hash function, and low for other bitwise
operations and random number generators. The passes are designated for the number of messages
sent by a reader or a tag.
5.2. Comparison of Security Threats
Protocols resistance to different RFID threats is presented in Table 3, where we denote ST1
for a replay attack, ST2 for a man-in-the-middle attack (MITM), ST3 for eavesdropping, ST4 for an
impersonating attack, ST5 for traceability, ST6 for desynchronization, ST7 for denial of service (DoS),
and ST8 for other types of attack. We found that most of the recently proposed protocols do not pay
close enough attention to DoS, MITM, and eavesdropping attacks, while most of the protocols consider
the system security against replay, impersonate, traceability, and desynchronization attacks. Certainly,
protocols [6,19,20,23,34,53,56] are strongly resistant to all of the major attacks.
Table 3. Comparison of Various Security Threats Resistance.
ST1 ST2 ST3 ST4 ST5 ST6 ST7 ST8
SB-A [11] Y Y Y Y Y Y * Cloning
SB-B [11] Y Y Y Y Y Y * Cloning
ECU [13] Y Y * Y Y * * *
SPA [14] N * * N Y * * *
EMA [15] Y * * N N * * *
PII [16] Y * * Y Y * * *
RUND [17] Y * * Y Y Y Y *
IECC [19] Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Cloning
EECC [20] Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Spoofing
RBAC [21] Y * * Y Y * Y *
NRS [22] N Y N N N N N *
NRS+ [10] N Y Y N N N N *
NRS++ [23] Y Y Y Y Y Y Y *
ACSP [24] N N N N N N N Counting
ACSP+ [25] N * * N Y Y N Counting
ACSP++ [23] Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Counting
LAP [26] Y * * N N N Y *
Flyweight [29] Y Y Y Y Y Y * *
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ST1 ST2 ST3 ST4 ST5 ST6 ST7 ST8
MASS [31] N N N N Y N * *
EP-UAP [32] N Y Y N Y * * *
DRAP [33] Y * * Y Y Y Y Y
GUPA [34] Y Y Y Y Y Y Y DoP
FTest [35] Y Y Y Y Y * * Counterfeit + Collision
ACS [36] Y Y Y Y Y * * Counterfeit + Collision
HBA [37] N Y Y Y Y Y N Brute + Counterfeit
HBA+ [6] Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Brute for
VLP [38] Y Y Y * Y Y * *
OMP [39] N * * Y Y Y Y *
SEAS [40] Y Y * Y Y Y Y *
SAP [41] Y * Y Y Y * * *
STS [43] Y * * Y Y Y Y *
CWH+ [44] Y * Y Y * Y * Disclosure
PGX [46] Y Y Y Y N Y * Cloning
PGM [46] Y Y Y Y N Y * Cloning
MACC [48] Y Y * Y N Y Y *
MACD [48] Y Y * Y Y Y Y *
HBROT [53] Y Y Y Y Y Y Y *
HBPER [56] Y Y Y Y Y Y Y *
ST1: replay attack, ST2: man-in-the-middle, ST3: eavesdropping, ST4: impersonate attack, ST5: traceability, ST6:
desynchronization, ST7: DoS, ST8: other types of attack, Y: satisfied, N: not satisfied. *: not applicable.
5.3. Comparison of Security Requirements
Security requirements for an RFID system should be satisfied in order for the system to defend
against the attacks mentioned in this paper. Table 4 compares the security requirements in each
protocol, which includes mutual authentication (SR1), confidentiality (SR2), message integrity (SR3),
privacy (SR4), forward secrecy (SR5), backward secrecy (SR6), tag anonymity (SR7), and conforming to
EPC standards (SR8). We found that most of the protocols fully considered the mutual authentication,
privacy, and data protection, while backward secrecy is given the least attention, and should be more
considered in future work. However, Niu et al. [39] and X. Chen [23] completely satisfied all of the
security requirements in their protocol.
Table 4. Comparison of the Security Requirements.
SR1 SR2 SR3 SR4 SR5 SR6 SR7 SR8
SB-A [11] Y Y Y Y Y * Y N
SB-B [11] Y Y Y Y Y * Y N
ECU [13] N Y Y Y Y * Y N
SPA [14] * * * * N * * *
EMA [15] * * * * N * * *
PII [16] * * * * N * * *
RUND [17] Y Y Y Y Y * Y N
IECC [19] Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N
EECC [20] Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N
RBAC [21] Y Y Y Y * * Y N
NRS [22] N Y N N N N N Y
NRS+ [10] N Y Y N N N N Y
NRS++ [23] Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
ACSP [24] Y N N N N N N Y
ACSP+ [25] Y Y Y * N Y * Y
ACSP++ [23] Y Y Y Y Y Y * Y
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Table 4. Cont.
SR1 SR2 SR3 SR4 SR5 SR6 SR7 SR8
LAP [26] Y Y Y N Y * N Y
Flyweight [29] Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
MASS [31] Y Y N * Y * * Y
EP-UAP [32] N Y Y Y * * Y Y
DRAP [33] Y * * Y * * Y Y
GUPA [34] Y Y Y Y Y * Y Y
FTest [35] N Y Y Y Y * Y Y
ACS [36] Y * * Y * * Y Y
HBA [37] Y Y Y Y Y * Y Y
HBA+ [6] Y Y Y Y Y * Y Y
VLP [38] Y Y Y Y Y * Y Y
OMP [39] Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
SEAS [40] Y Y Y Y Y * Y Y
SAP [41] Y Y Y * * * * Y
STS [43] Y Y Y Y Y * Y Y
CWH+ [44] Y Y Y * Y * * Y
PGX [46] Y * * N * * N Y
PGM [46] Y * * N * * N Y
MACC [48] Y Y Y N Y * N Y
MACD [48] Y Y Y Y Y * Y Y
HBROT [53] Y Y Y Y Y * * Y
HBPER [56] Y Y Y Y Y * * Y
SR1: mutual authentication, SR2: confidentiality, SR3: message integrity, SR4: privacy, SR5: forward secrecy,
SR6: backward secrecy, SR7: tag anonymity, SR8: conforming to EPC standard, Y: satisfied, N: not satisfied, *:
not applicable.
6. Conclusions
Recent RFID authentication protocols are proposed to develop an efficient and secure RFID
system. This survey is conducted to review and compare different RFID authentication protocols of
low-cost passive tags for better utilization in the appropriate application. We demonstrate in this
study the security requirements of an RFID system that must be satisfied, so the system could be able
to defend major attacks such as replay, man-in-the-middle, impersonation, desynchronization, DoS,
and more. We further identify the category levels of the protocols based on the operation complexity
on the tag side, and compare the protocols based on the tag computation cost. Since the RFID
passive tag has limited resources to compute complex operations, the heavyweight and simple-weight
protocols are not feasible for practical implementation. However, lightweight and ultra-lightweight
protocols use only simple operations within the tag computation limits, and show the lowest tag
overhead level. Lightweight and ultra-lightweight protocols are considered the most suitable for the
current applications. Another vital aspect when considering the appropriate RFID protocol is the
security resistance to the attacks. We examined the security threats in each protocol presented in
the review. We found out that Chang et al. [6], Farash [19], Zhang and Qi [20], X. Chen et al. [23],
Liu et al. [34], Lin and Song [53], and Ouaskou et al. [56] protocols successfully resist all of the
major attacks. Although the other protocols could not resist all of the attacks, they could perform
better than the fully secure protocols in term of computation cost; examples include the protocols
presented in Farash [19], Zhang and Qi [20], X. Chen et al. [23], and Liu et al. [34], which have high
computation overhead on the tag side. We encourage researchers to pay attention to the forward
and backward security, since most protocols do not reflect on these two types of attacks. Finally,
maintaining the basic security requirements for an RFID system is required to achieve protection
against the mentioned attacks in this article. Our assessment is that only the protocols of Niu et al. [39]
and X. Chen et al. [23] satisfy all of the security requirements to maintain the system in a stable and
available state. Even though this review shows security variation among the reviewed protocols, each
one could still be a preference over others, depending on the requirements of the application in hand.
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